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Abstract
The analogy between spatial inclusion and set membership oers the opportunity to
go beyond the study of how we establish analogical mappings to the investigation of the
impact of those mappings on mental process This analogy is the basis of longstanding
didactic techniques for teaching elementary logic Eulers Circles and Venn Diagrams
and therefore bears on psychological theories of human deductive reasoning eg Erickson
	

An adequate cognitive theory of analogy must explain how mental processing is aided
by analogical mappings In the case of spatial inclusion as an analogy for set membership
this comes down to requiring a theory of how graphical representations aid processing
Here we sketch a general theory in terms of the specicity of graphics which we have
developed further elsewhere see Stenning  Oberlander a b This general ap
proach to graphical representations rests on the observation that graphical representation
systems limit abstraction and thereby purchase computational tractability
In applying this general theory to the case of graphical methods of syllogism solution
we sketch a method of using Eulers Circles and show how interpretative conventions
for graphical objects allow the necessary abstractions In particular we show that even
choosing the least expressive system of diagrams limited to circles still gives the requisite
expressive power
The Eulers Circle method sketched is then used as a guide to connectionist implemen
tation of corresponding internal representations Graphical representations share some ge
neral computational properties with connectionist systems In the domain of the syllogism
the central issue is the implementation of the binding of attributes into typedescriptions
Various proposals for connectionist variable binding in the literature are assessed as par
tial implementations Some proposals are made for implementation of novel graphical
features of the Eulers Circle algorithm
This case study of an analogy suggests the hypothesis that one important role that
analogy may play is providing a representation which is more limited in expressive power
and therefore more computationally tractable than the literal representations analogies
supplant
 
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  Introduction
An analogy consists of an object and something to which that object is likened This compa
rison is made in order to understand or reason about the object and the purpose of analogy
is to facilitate these processes Adapting a terminology of I A Richards  	 itself based
on an analogy I will call the object of the analogy the topic and the thing it is likened to
the vehicle The vehicle of an analogy at least a good analogy	 enables or facilitates some
reasoning about the topic A cognitive theory of analogy must explain this facilitation as well
as what mapping is established and how
This paper is a case study of a particular analogy between spatial inclusion and set members
hip While this analogy may have features which others lack and may lack features which
others have as an example it has the virtue that it is possible to be rather precise about
the properties of both vehicle and topic Furthermore because we can specify the reasoning
which the analogy is supposed to facilitate we can hope to be precise about the facilitation
in reasoning that results from the employment of the analogy Even if some of the empirical
observations have not yet been made it is possible to specify what would be required to
test this theory of the e
cacy of an analogy in achieving the facilitation of say syllogistic
reasoning Thus we intend a claim that this is a good analogy The very staying power of
graphical teaching methods in elementary logic is strong anecdotal evidence We intend our
theory to explain why these teaching methods work
We did not initially set out with analogy as our object of study The original focus was
an account of dierences between graphical and linguistic representations But one result
of this starting point is the realisation that analogies are representations Vehicles represent
topics and operations dened on vehicles can then be interpreted as operations on their
topics Just as analogies consist of partial mappingsnot every property of the vehicle has
an interpretation in the domain of the topic so representations have properties in virtue
of which they represent and other properties which are irrelevant to their interpretation as
representations Related views of analogy as representation have been put forward by Holland
et al  	 and by Halford Wilson Guo Wiles  Stewart this volume	
Shifting perspective on the problem in this way suggests the extension of a claim developed
elsewhere as an explanation of why graphical representations aid reasoning Our hypothesis is
that graphical representations aid processing because they restrict abstraction see Stenning
 Oberlander   a and Stenning  Oberlander   b for more extensive development of this
theory	 Extended to a general hypothesis about analogy this would suggest that analogies
work because vehicles are less expressive in a well dened technical sense of expressive	 than
their topics and therefore easier to process
A possible complaint against this approach to analogy is that our example is anaemic If the
readers interest in analogy is the role it plays in reasoning about illformulated domains or in
learning about conceptually rich and novel domains then this is not the obvious example to
choose Users of this analogy typically know all that they need to know about set membership
before they encounter this analogy It would be di
cult indeed to decide whether vehicle
or topic is epistemologically more basic both being about as basic as concepts can get
Some might argue that ontogenetically the one is derived from the other Piaget  	
has argued thus and the localist hypothesis see eg Lyons  	 for a review	 which

claims that abstract concepts such as set membership develop from spatial relations such
as containment has some linguistic support This author is sceptical about this hypothesis
as an epistemological derivation for Kantian reasons it is hard to see how individuals or
space or time or any other fundamental concept can be independent of the basic concepts of
set theory As a developmental derivation the hypothesis may have much to recommend it
Indeed the developmental version of the localist hypothesis amounts to the theory that our
example analogy operates during ontogenesis Be that as it may the average introductory
logic student may be assumed to be beyond Paigets stages and the e
cacy of the analogy
for calculating syllogistic conclusions remains after conceptual developments are complete
Another source of complaint about our example is the temptation to etymologise analogy as
meaning without logic see for example JohnsonLaird  	 where analogical reasoning is
contrasted with logical reasoning	 Our analogy is actually a palpable aid to logical reasoning
of the most mundane varietyquite tting for a word whose actual etymological derivation
is from a mathematical term for equality of ratios
There are two responses to these complaints about our choice of example We do not mean
to impugn the importance of analogy as a method of reasoning in illdened conceptually rich
domains Ours is a modest proposal not intended to do more than throw some light on one
aspect of a large topic an aspect that may be usefully studied in a domain where vehicle
topic and reasoning task are all well dened
The second response is that even this anaemic analogy appears to be capable of playing a role
in bringing about rather fundamental changes in peoples grasp of some of the most abstract
of concepts Part of the problem novice logic students face is understanding the dierence
between validity and truth We will argue that our example analogy plays an important role
in making some of the most abstract aspects of model theory transparent to language users
who have not previously much engaged the exercise of pure deductive inference If such an
anaemic analogy can have this signicant conceptual impact it may prove more fullblooded
than we at rst supposed It may also get us to reconsider our etymologies and the relation
between logic and thinking
The plan of the paper is as follows In the next section we briey outline the theory of
graphical representations that lies behind this approach to investigating their role in mental
processes In Section  we sketch a method for using Eulers Circles to draw inferences from
pairs of syllogistic premisses In Section  we then examine in more detail the correspondences
and noncorrespondences	 between our graphical vehicle and its logical topic measuring the
general theory against the details of the example illustrating how the graphical representati
ons limit the expressive power of language In Section  we ilustrate how graphics still permit
just the abstractions that are required for Eulers Circles to constitute a theorem prover for
this small fragment of elementary logic In Section  we consider the relation between our
graphical system and mental implementations of syllogistic reasoning Finally in Section 
we return to draw some conclusions about analogy from this comparative study of linguistic
and graphical representations

 Comparing graphical representations with language
One goal of a cognitive theory of graphical representation is to explain why graphical re
presentations have dierent cognitive characteristics than linguistic representations At a
pretheoretical level the phenomena to be explained are similarities and dierences between
performance with external graphical and external linguistic representations We want a theory
which will explain why people perform as they do with the same tasks posed in linguistic
in graphical and also in mixed linguistic and graphical terms Our intuitions are that many
inferential tasks are just obviously more easily posed and solved in graphical terms though
some may actually be harder A satisfactory theory will explain both these types of case We
acknowledge that there are many di
culties in equating problems expressed in dierent me
dia This is an important part of the reason for wanting a theory of graphical representations
couched in logicalcomputational terms Nevertheless for an excellent discussion motivating
the intuition we recommend Barwise and Etchemendy  	
A cognitive theory of performance with external graphical and linguistic representations will
not be able to avoid giving a theoretical account of the internal representations which sup
port performance When we come to discuss implementation we will point out some a
nities
between graphical representations and connectionist mechanisms We see as one of the main
benets of formulating a general theory of the logical and computational properties of gra
phics the clarication that results when considering questions of internal implementation of
the structures and processes that reason over the external representations
We will not do more than briey describe our general theory here insofar as is necessary to
understand the specic example analogy at hand The central tenet of the theory is that
graphical representations limit the expression of abstractions and thereby improve processa
bility The intuition that graphics limit abstraction is at least as old as Bishop Berkeleys
arguments against Lockes picturetheory of word meaning Berkeley   	 A picture of a
triangle has determinate angles and ratios of sides whereas the word triangle xes none of
these The word abstracts where the picture cannot This insight needs to be related to the
equally often expressed intuition that actual systems of graphical reasoning do manage to
express abstractions graphically The geometry diagrams that concerned Berkeley do express
abstractions when one analyses their deployment in the systems of inference in which they
are embedded A proof must make no recourse to the accidental properties of its example
diagrams By the same store examples are chosen to be the most general casesan irregular
triangle rather than an equilateral one if the proof is not to depend on equal sides
These twin intuitions appear to give with one hand and take away with the other Graphics
limit abstraction in some ways but allow it in others This impression appears to us to be the
main reason why these twin intuitions have never been built into a general theory of graphical
representation On close examination this impression of a conservation of abstraction can
be seen for the conjurors illusion that it is What the concreteness of primitively interpreted
graphics takes away with one hand is not the same as what the employment of abstractive
conventions of interpretation give with the other Watch very carefully and you will see the
rabbit left behind in the hat
What is required to turn these twin intuitions into a theory is rst a precise account of
what limitations on the expression of abstraction primitively interpreted graphics impose and

second a precise account of what abstractions can and which cannot be captured by abstractive
conventions of interpretation working over these graphics The dierence is what makes the
theory contentful If all abstractions that were denied by graphics could be reinstated with
equal facility by conventions of interpretation then we would be left with no theory of the
cognitive dierences between these two types of representational system
A logical characterisation of the concreteness of graphical representations can be given by
dening languages with limited powers of abstraction One of the most powerful limitations
on the logical language of graphical representations is that they contain no quantiers and
the identity relations between all constants are xed by axioms of identity This reects the
fact that it is not possible to picture two elements without determining whether they are the
same element or not and is one of the most powerful aids to making inferences from graphical
representations The remainder of graphical specicity consists in the fact that the spatial
vocabulary comes in sets of items which mutually determine each other It is not possible to
x a relation such as x is right of y in a picture without also xing whether or not x is left
of y This aspect of specicity is far harder to exhaustively capture logically but nevertheless
corresponds to the extreme overdetermination of graphical representations see Stenning 
Oberlander   b	 for a fuller account where these ideas are related to those of Levesque
 	 and others	 The reader will have realised from this description that specicity is
intended as a property of representation systems not of single representations themselves
What distinguishes pictures from language is that language can determine all or none of these
features of a depicted scene Pictures force us to determine them whether we care to or not
What abstractions can be made by conventions of interpretation for these concrete graphical
objects How can one diagram be made to stand for a disjunction of possibilities Here
it seems that the line that can be drawn is not so hard and fast We can state ever more
complex interpretative conventions for some graphical system of representations which allow
ever more abstractions to be expressed However we have a clear sense that more and more
work is being done by the language and less and less by the pictures that the language helps
us interpret We are condent that careful empirical investigation of the e
cacy of such
complexly interpreted graphics would show that the pictures are not worth the thousands of
words they require for their interpretation
If we cannot yet give a full account of what abstractions can easily be achieved by interpre
tation conventions we can indicate some clear guidelines Monadic properties of pictured
elements are easily abstracted over This is what happens when we dene symbols in a
diagramming system or icons for an interface We understand that squares stand for zebras
or items costing more than   or whatever These symbols function very like words and
their crucial property is that their semantics is not internally graphically componential At
this level it is quite easy to have a triangular icon function very like the abstraction expres
sed by the word triangle because the graphical properties of the icon are unanalysablethe
angles are not there to be interpreted as part of the diagram save through their status as part
of the icon
A further step towards abstraction in the interpretation of symbolic icons is through interpre
tative conventions which treat icons as metaobjects So for example a common convention
is to designate a particular shaped icon to operate as a variable ranging over a domain of
shapes rather than as representing its own shape A cylinder say then means an object of

any shape excluding a cylinder which shape becomes unrepresentable	 Of course it would
be possible to allow this cylindrical icon to represent cylinders as well but this seems a less
intuitive convention for understandable reasons A cylinder icon still cannot be interpreted as
standing for a cylinder since it might stand for any other shape In logical terms it is useful
to be able to distinguish between variables and constants
Again such conventions operate only for monadic properties The dierence between
this metaobject icon cylinderforanynoncylindershape	 and an exemplar icon specic
triangleforanytriangle	 appears to be more than one of degree This can be seen by com
paring this metaobject icon convention with one in which the cylinder stands for cylinders
as well as any other shape This later type of convention is merely a more general case of
abstractionfromexemplar like the specictriangleforanytriangle convention But it intui
tively has rather dierent psychological properties from the metaobject conventionnamely
it is much more confusing It would be interesting to know whether these intuitions can be
substantiated
Matters change dramatically when we consider polyadic properties either by analysing a
symbol into its graphical parts or by considering relations between symbols	 Suppose we
want to enter a symbol for a pawn into a picture of a chess board but we want to abstract
over a range of positions If we have one pawn on a chess board we might try dening a
convention which said that its position was only to be thought of as determinate with regard
to the half of the board it is on This is ne until we enter another piece The two pieces
then automatically have a whole range of their mutual spatial relations xed in the picture
But if we are to maintain our abstractive convention only some of these relations will be
interpretable So if they are in the same half of the board this fact can represent itself But
within that half the fact that X is nearer the edge than Y cannot be interpreted to mean
that this is true of the actual pieces Matters degenerate still further if some pieces positions
are deemed to represent their positions and others not One might as well have a linguistic
data base of the known facts about the pieces positions as a misleading picture and a very
large list of interpretative conventions telling us which graphical relations can be interpreted
and which not In fact the data base would look remarkably like the list of conventions
These remarks fall far short of a logical characterisation of the possibilities for abstractive
conventions but they su
ce to show that nothing like the resources of a polyadic quantied
language can be attained by interpretative conventions of reasonable complexity for graphical
representations They also strongly suggest that the interesting cognitive properties of gra
phical systems will emerge from consideration of their portrayal of relations rather than of the
behaviour of iconic representation of wordlike symbols Our analogy between set membership
and spatial containment falls in exactly this domain
The role of graphics in reasoning is a topic with a long history in AI Gelernter  	 reports
work from the late  s which used geometry as a domain in which to show that giving a
diagram to a heuristic theorem prover provided opportunities to drastically prune the search
space for proofs Simply rejecting subgoals which were false in the diagram was enough to
bring previously intractable proofs within the ambit of their theorem prover These techniques
rely on statistical properties of geometry diagrams Any particular diagram is sampled from
an extremely large space of possible diagrams The chances for example that two lines
in an arbitrarily constructed example diagram should be equal unless they are equal in all

possible diagrams is quite small Gelernter specically notes that this technique has problems
with proving inequalities where this reasoning cannot help The chances that an arbitrarily
constructed example diagram should have AB CD are high whether or not this is true of all
examples ie a theorem
Within the framework developed here Gelernters work is a good example of how the employ
ment of graphics in reasoning aids processing by curtailing abstraction and how conventions
of interpretation can achieve the expression of some abstractions but not all
Funt    	 developed this line of research further by incorporating simulations of the
perception of diagrams into a system for reasoning about their mechanical properties A
retina of communicating elements with a simulated parallel inference mechanism made rapid
detection of spatial properties such as the centers and symmetries of planar solids A high
level reasoner took these judgements as input and made inferences about the trajectories of
fall of shapes in unstable stacks of blocks This is a problem which would be hard for a general
purpose reasoner working on data expressed as propositions in a fully abstractive language
It is the spatial nature of the retina which enables rapid extraction of spatial properties from
the input This work underlines what Stenning and Oberlander take as given The e
cient
content addressable search of graphics for data for reasoning is possible because our visual
system can perform these lowlevel inferences using parallel mechanisms But Funt takes for
granted what Stenning and Oberlander emphasisethat it is the lack of abstractive power of
diagrams and scenes	 which means that our visual system could evolve If our input were
in full rst order predicate calculus there would be no such parallel processing system Both
Funt and Gelernter can be seen as much more detailed workings out of the current general
approach within the particular domain of geometrical reasoning
Other work has had goals closer to those of Stenning and Oberlanders general account com
paring reasoning with graphical and with linguistic representations Lindsay  	 contrasts
deductive reasoning with the sort of nondiscursive reasoning that graphics makes available
Once input has been organised as an image results can be just read o Biological systems
which give a high priority to rapid response but may be content with slow oline input
favour this design choice Learning a skill may be slow but its excercise generally requires
uency The motivation of Lindsays argument is similar the detail diers in that he relies
on an architectural distinction to dene his rather nonstandard sense of deduction and he
lays less stress on the curtailment of abstraction that image construction enforces
Finally JohnsonLairds eg  	 work on mental models is an approach to spatial reaso
ning and therefore related to our current concerns Mental models have some of the properties
of graphical representationsthey are two dimensional and are agglomerative in that they
enforce connectedness between represented elements They amount to a strategy of theo
rem proving which proceeds by building models of the logical variety	 which initially may
force overspecication However the exposition JohnsonLaird chooses stresses the idea that
mental models are analogical and semantic and disguises their connection to prior graphical
systems such as Eulers Circles and indeed their relation to logical methods such as tableau
proof systems Neither does JohnsonLaird give any account of what limitations on expressive
power mental models have and therefore no account of how this aids inferential tractability
We will see below that mental models are much more closely related to Eulers Circles than
JohnsonLaird allows but that Eulers Circles aord e
ciencies of memory and reasoning by

exploitation of their graphical nature
 Eulers Circles as an extended analogy for syllogistic logic
The analogy between the spatial containment of points and the membership of elements in
sets is actually like most interesting example analogies only the iceberg tip of an extended
analogy The intersection of sets is analogous to the overlapping of regions The setproper
subset relation is analogous to the containment of one region by another Separate regions
are analogous to disjoint sets Relative movement of pairs of regions corresponds to ranges of
set relations Constraints on movement can be interpreted as logical relations between sets
We rst describe this extended analogy as it functions in one method of using Eulers Circles
to implement syllogistic logic We beg the readers patience while we specify the details of
this particular development of our analogy The detail is necessary for an understanding of
how the analogy works  A more detailed treatment of this graphical method and its relations
to other methods of syllogistic reasoning is given in Stenning  Oberlander   b	
We prefer to develop this highly procedural account of the use of Eulers Circles rather than
analyse the version of the analogy embedded in the use of Venn Diagrams The latter are
probably more widely used in logic text books and they have some virtues for logical analysis
However they are much less thoroughly graphical in that they exploit extensive annotation
systems added to a single graphical arrangement of circles It is our intuition that Eulers
Circles have much more interesting psychological properties which stem from their greater
graphical involvement and its impact on human working memory though we know of no
empirical comparison of the properties of the two systems as teaching aids Eulers Circles
are a more interesting development of our analogy
Some psychological theories of reasoning have hypothesised that people use a mental version
of Eulers Circles to solve syllogisms eg Erickson  	 but they have chosen to develop
their theories with an idiosyncratic interpretation of the diagrams This is probably because
there are few if any explicit accounts of the use of Eulers Circles available in the literature
We sketch such a method here and refer the interested reader to Stenning  Oberlander
  b	 for further details
A brief description of categorial syllogisms is in order They are deductive arguments con
sisting of two premisses and a conclusion but for our purposes are conveniently identied
merely as premiss pairs Premisses have one of four quantier types relating three terms eg
All A are B Some B are A No C are B Some C are not A	 Pairs of premisses must share
a middle term we choose B	 and hence there are four gures AB BC AB CB BA BC
and BA CB	 The last can be transformed into the rst by reordering the premisses which
does not aect the logic but may aect the psychology	 Conclusions contain the same four
quantiers but always relate A and C Four quantiers combined with two premisses in four
gures yield  pairs of premisses Of these  have valid conclusions
The three predicates of a syllogism dene eight types of individual ABC ABC ABC
ABC ABC ABC ABC and ABC Syllogisms are interpreted on domains
consisting of selections from this set Since syllogistic logic is a fragment of monadic logic
with no identity relation it is logically immaterial how many of a type of individual are in

a domain because the logic has no relational resources for distinguishing between individuals
which have the same properties Domains are also constrained to contain some As some
Bs and some Cs the NoEmptySets Axiom	 Furthermore the inclusion or exclusion of
the totally negative type ABC is syllogistically immaterialthis type corresponds to
the background of graphical representations There are therefore 
 
models minus those
containing emptysets relevant to the interpretation of the syllogism
The strategy adopted by the theorem prover we describe is to represent only types of individual
consistent with the syllogisms premisses The range of types constructed represents both
premisses in a single agglomerated representation Having represented a range of consistent
types the method identies any types of individual whose existence is established by the
premisses If there is no such type there is no conclusion If there is then the process of
formulating a conclusion revolves around this single type of individual Existential conclusions
may be drawn immediately universal conclusions require checking of constraints
The method we describe is a rational method which will yield correct conclusions in all cases
and which bears a particularly transparent relation to the underlying model theory of the
syllogism However it can readily be related to the variety of error behaviour which subjects
frequently exhibit
We believe that psychologists failure to understand how Eulers Circles are used is a result
of adopting a primitive interpretation of the graphical representations That they should
have done this is a point of some interest to our theory of graphics and their abstractive
interpretation to which we return below
The Erickson interpretation of Eulers Circles is that each subregion of a diagram stands for a
type of individual which exists This interpretation means that the mapping from diagrams of
two sets to syllogistic premisses is manytoone see Figure  	 A more normal interpretation
of these diagrams is that each region of a diagram stands for a type of individual which is
consistent with the premisses see Figure 	 Coupled with the strategy of representing all
consistent types of individual this convention greatly simplies the circles use The distinction
between the two conventions can be brought out by adding to the latter an ancillary convention
which shades any region representing types of individuals entailed by the premisses This
combined convention for interpreting Eulers Circle diagrams restores the onetoone mapping
of Eulers Circle diagrams to premisses Probably the most perspicuous way of thinking of
the shading convention is that shading distinguishes between derived shaded	 and assumed
unshaded	 types Figure   and Figure  compare the two dierent conventions
The most complete theory of human syllogistic performance is due to JohnsonLaird eg
 	 and is couched in Mental Model Theory JohnsonLaird makes much of the contrast
between Eulers Circles and Mental Models and of the inadequacies of Eulers Circles Sten
ning   	 and Stenning  Oberlander   b	 have shown that this argument rests on
Ericksons misinterpretation of Eulers Circles which JohnsonLaird adopts	 and when a fai
thful account of Eulers Circles is substituted mental models are notational variants of Eulers
Circles The latter are however naturally constrained as a notation by their geometry as we
discuss below In these matters constraint is a virtue Eulers Circles are directly based on
an analogy in a way that Mental Models obscure JohnsonLaird cannot explain why mental
model notation which is just another prooftheory	 is psychologically preferable to any other
logical approach

All A are B
Some A are B
Some A are not B
No A are B
B
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
A
Figure   The ve Gergonne relations between two circles mapped onto the four syllogistic
premisses Arrows point from a premiss to each of the diagrams in which the premiss is true
All A are B
Some A are B
Some A are not B
No A are B
B
B
A
A
BA
BA
Figure  Characteristic Eulers Circle representations of syllogistic premisses Regions re
present types of individual consistent with premisses Shaded regions represent types of
individual established by the premisses
 
With our interpretation of the regions each premiss is now represented by a single shaded
diagram it remains to specify how the diagrams representing two premisses are registered to
yield a composite diagram and how conclusions are drawn from this agglomerated represen
tation Figure  shows the eight registration diagrams which are the basis of all conventionally
expressible syllogistic conclusions In each case the B circles of the two premisses are exactly
superimposed Positive and negative syllogisms are separated to emphasise that the nature
of the logical constraints are dierent in the two cases negative syllogisms are dened as
syllogisms with at least one negative premiss	 If only the B circles were labelled in the re
gistration diagrams each diagram represents a group of syllogisms which can be derived by
the two dierent assignments of A and C to the other two circles Abstracting over these
labellings reduces the number of diagrams and focusses on the relevant graphical properties
However to aid reading one arbitrary AC labelling is assigned in each diagram Figure 
shows the diagrams for a group of syllogisms which license conclusions of the form Some not
As are not Cs These conclusions are not conventionally expressible in the syllogism They
also violate one of the principles of the conventional formulation of the syllogism that no pair
of negative premisses have any valid conclusion Figure  shows the registration diagrams for
all other syllogisms
In all registrations the A and C circles are arranged with as much overlap as is consistent with
the premissesin other words the maximum number of types consistent with the premisses are
represented The existence of valid conclusion is identied with the existence of constraints on
the consistent arrangement of the A and C circles For positive syllogisms some region exists
which prevents A and C from being totally separated  and this region cannot be consistently
eliminated For negative syllogisms some region exists which prevents A and C from being
superimposed  and this region cannot be consistently eliminated
The reasoners task is to identify these critical regions We begin by stating a normative
strategy which is transparently related to the model theory of the syllogism We will then
look briey at some of the heuristics which subjects appear to use and which are evidenced
by their errors
Shaded regions in the characteristic diagrams of premisses may be circular crescent shaped
or oval A syllogism only has a valid conclusion if one of these shaded regions persists in
the combined diagram not intersected by any arc during the registration process  Either the
shaded region must be wholly included within the third circle derived from the other premiss
or it must be wholly excluded from that circle In model theoretic terms if C is the third
circle and C intersects the shaded region from the premiss then it is subdivided into two
regions and no conclusion can be drawn because either one or the other of these regions can
consistently be eliminated
Our spatial analogy can be enriched into a mechanical analogy if a nail is driven through one
of these persistent shaded regions in the nished registration diagram then it will constrain
the movement of the A and C circles In a positive syllogism the nail will prevent the A
and C circles from being slid apart in a negative syllogism the nail will prevent the A and C
circles from being superimposed If no shaded region persists unintersected in the registration
diagram then there is no valid conclusion
Thus abstract properties of the model theory of the syllogism are directly reected in geo
metric properties of circles If these truths of model theory were parochial to the syllogism
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Figure  Registration diagrams with valid conclusions Key premiss  premiss  registra
tion diagram	 Registration involves the superimposition of the B circles of each premiss
The A and C labels are given for ease of readingthey can always be reversed throughout a
registration sequence without logical eect
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Figure  Registration diagrams with uvalid conclusions Key premiss  premiss  regi
stration diagram	 These syllogisms warrant conclusions of the uform ie Some not A are
not C N B The A and C circles can adopt any of the ve Gergonne relations but constraint
lies in their mutual relation to B
it would be hard to see how the spatial analogy could helpwhy should these stratgies of
registration seem natural or indeed comprehensible But these truths are not parochial and
students do appear to have some general grasp of them before approaching the syllogism
Their problem is to work out the consequences of their highlevel grasp in the novel domain
of arguments We return to these points in Section 
The persistent shaded regions also play a central role in formulating conclusionsestablishing
the existence of a valid conclusion still leaves its linguistic formulation to achieve Formulation
of conclusions continues on from the identication of established individuals represented by
the nailed subregions of the diagrams Existential conclusions can be drawn directly from
the specication of these established individuals Dropping the middle term predicate and
existentially quantifying over the resulting conjunction of A or its negation and C or its
negation yields the existential conclusion So if the premiss establishes that there is an
ABC then conclude some A is not C
Universal conclusions are more complex since they require that the nailed region of the regi
stration diagram is circular and corresponds to either A or C Intuitively all members of A
or C must be known to be of the established type in order to make a universal conclusion In
fact only two registration diagrams top positive and top negative in Figure 	 allow universal
conclusions Although the double shaded region in the second negative registration case down
is circular it represents B and therefore does not allow generalisation over all members of A
or C as the diagram shows No other diagram in Figure  contains a double shaded circular
area In Figure  the only double shaded circular area corresponds to B and so there is no
call for a universal utype premiss
A mechanical analogy corresponding to the nails for existential conclusions is that of a pastry
cutter for universal conclusions Where there is a universal conclusion such a device prevents
the separation in the case of positive syllogisms	 or the intersection in the case of negative
syllogisms	 of any part of the target region from the other circle A universal generalisation
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Figure  Registration diagrams with no valid conclusions Key premiss 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about its contents is therefore valid The pastry cutter wholly contains a circle within it
whereas a nail merely guarantees or prevents intersection
We have now described a system of reasoning which manipulates graphical even quasi
mechanical objects in such a way that a consistent interpretation of those objects in terms
of set theory models syllogistic logic In the next section we go on to consider what pro
perties of the graphical objects and what properties of the logic permit this analogy but
rst we make some comments on the relation between this normative algorithm and peoples
observed reasoning behaviour
As the reader will probably have noticed there is quite a close relation between the existence
of areas of the registration diagrams which are doubly shaded and the existence of valid
conclusions The region which persists unintersected from premiss diagram into registration
diagram tends to be doubleshaded in the nal result In all but one of the eight registration
cases which yield conventionally valid conclusions there is an area of double shading once
the two premissdiagrams are registered the exception being the bottom case in Figure 
This syllogism is the hardest one with a valid conclusion in the data of several experiments
on syllogisms eg JohnsonLaird  Steedman  	 The two uvalid registration diagrams
also have doublyshaded areas
There are diagrams with doubly shaded areas which do not have valid conclusions See Figure
	 If subjects were simply using the existence of such areas to decide whether there is a valid
conclusion these cases would invoke inferences but many do not However there are easy
clues to the absence of valid conclusions in many of the cases where there is double shading
and we do not need to suppose that doubleshading is used as the only basis on which to
decide whether there is a conclusion Firstly there are two cases with double shading in
which the registration diagram represents all seven possible types of individual the bottom
case and the case third from the bottom in Figure 	 If all types are possible there is no
valid conclusion Secondly these seventype diagrams and one other with double shading
are also all cases in which two existential premisses combine and it seems likely that subjects
have some explicitly formulated knowledge that there are no conclusions in these cases It is
interesting that this logical principle is robust whereas the other of Aristotles main principles
that no two negative premisses have a valid conclusion	 is quite arbitrary as we have seen
This leaves only positive cases and the top negative case in Figure  The three positive cases
all exhibit double shading and all are observed to invoke quite high rates of invalid conclusion
The remaining negative case with double shading is the hardest no valid conclusion NVC	
syllogism of allthe presence of double shading appears to cue subjects to believe there is a
valid conclusion
As we shall see in Section  premisses with valid conclusions all entail the existence of
maximal types of individual maximal in the sense of being specied with regard to all three
predicates The shading convention and our mechanical extension of the geometric analogy
to nailing is an expression of this logical propertythe regions which are critical to reasoning
are ones that represent individuals that must exist Shaded regions of characteristic premiss
diagrams represent types of individual specied on two properties Doubly shaded regions
of registration diagrams represent types of individuals specied by three predicates This
pattern of responses provides evidence that subjects are paying attention to these critical
individual types in their reasoning in a way that the shading convention mirrors
 
Further evidence is provided by performance in an extended syllogistic task in which subjects
are asked to describe types of individuals which are entailed to exist by the premisses Yule
  	 Although the uvalid cases are quite di
cult about half of subjects can correctly infer
the existence of individuals which are B but are not A and not C Given a task that allows
subjects scope reveals their ability to reason in terms of maximal types
To summarise this digression on the relation between our graphical algorithm and observa
tions of human reasoning there is a good correspondence between strategies revealed by the
algorithm and observed performance In particular the presenceabsence of double shading
in registration diagrams in conjunction with other factors exerts a powerful inuence in
subject performance The graphical algorithm suggests new observations which yield corro
borating data This is not the place for an extended treatment of the extensive empirical data
on human syllogistic reasoning but these preliminary observations are certainly suggestive
 The Inexpressiveness of Circles and the Limitations of Sy
llogistic Logic
Models of the syllogism are sets of types of individual drawn from the seven types ABC
ABC ABC ABC ABC ABC ABC and ABC The set fABC ABCg
is for example a model of the premisses Some A are not B Some C are not B Having
sketched one graphical method for reasoning about syllogisms we can ask what distinctions
between models the systems representations can express and what distinctions between mo
dels it is necessary to express in order to capture the logic of the syllogism How do the
geometrical properties of circles constrain distinctions between sets of types of individuals
dened by their intersections How is the expressive power that remains despite these con
straints related to that necessary to capture the logic of the syllogism Our hypothesis is that
the benet of our analogy is that it constrains the processing required for inference We are
therefore looking for gaps in expressive power of graphics which correspond to distinctions
which are not necessary to capture the limited logic
What models can Eulers Circles express As we have seen above there are 
 
models to
consider Some of these have empty sets in which there are no As or no Bs or no Cs	 and
are thereby excluded from the standard interpretation of the syllogism How do the graphical
properties of circles constrain the expressive possibilities Limiting oursleves to circles is the
most restrictive graphical option Other weaker constraints would be to allow convex regions
or closed curves in general or even discontinuous curves Each of these would allow more
models to be expressed However in the spirit of our hypothesis that graphics aids reasoning
by limiting expressive power we will opt to analyse what circles allow We will see that circles
are in fact quite su
cient to the logic of the syllogism
Table   shows the number of models which have empty sets the number without empty
sets and having no Euler diagram and the number without empty sets and having an Euler
Diagram These numbers are all under the restriction of the diagrams vocabulary to circles
of varying size The models are classied by the number of elements which they contain For
instance the model fABC ABCg has two elements About half of the models without
empty sets are expressible A rather smaller proportion of larger models are expressible than
 
No of elements Contains No Euler Has Euler Totals
in model Empty Sets Diagram Diagram
      
      
     
      
     
      
    
      
Total       
Table   Numbers of models expressible by Eulers Circles classied by the number of their
elements
of smaller models Which models do Eulers Circles need to be able to express in order
to capture the syllogism Which distinctions between models are unnecessary Syllogisms
are highly constrained not merely in their limitation to three predicates but also in their
quanticationalconnective resources and the limitation to a pair of premisses As we have
seen of the seven logically relevant types of individual ABC never makes a logical
dierence in the syllogism	 one type cannot be the basis of any conclusion expressible by
the four conventional quantiers ABC requires a u conclusion Some not A is not C	
Inspection shows that another type A  BC	 cannot be established by any pair of syllogistic
premisses it requires a quantier such as All not A are not B	
The best characterisation of the model discriminations necessary for capturing syllogistic logic
can be given in terms of the relation between establishing types of individual dened by the
A and C properties or their negations	 and the existence of valid conclusions The syllogism
has the very restrictive property that only pairs of premisses which establish the existence of
such individuals have valid conclusions Table  gives examples of syllogisms which establish
each type of individual For example if all A are B and all B are C then there must exist
individuals	 of the type ABC and this syllogism is one with valid conclusions In contrast
if all A are B and all C are B none of the seven types need exist adequate models of the
premisses can leave out each of the seven types	 and there are no valid conclusions It is
this modeltheoretic perspective that reveals the syllogisms diagrammed in Figure  that do
establish the type ABC but have no conventionally expressible conclusion because the
quantier resources cant express the fact that there are some As that are Bs	 Once an
established type has been identied the existence or nonexistence of other types is logically
irrelevant

It is this property that licenses the focus of attention on a single type of indivi
dual and greatly reduces the need for distinguishing models particularly large models The
inexpressible large models are inexpressible because it is impossible to express the exclusion
of some types consistent with the premisses This exclusion is always logically immaterial
the conclusions that do hinge on the existence or nonexistence of these types are inexpres
sible in the syllogism In monadic predicate calculus every model can be uniquely specied
 
This is a property of categorial syllogisms but not of logics in general For example from  xAx 
Bx xBx  Cx and  xBx  Bx it follows that  xAx  Cx but none of the possible types of
individual are established to exist
 
Type Example syllogism that establishes Type
ABC All A are B All B are C
ABC All A are B No B are C
ABC None Require All A are B	
ABC No A are B All C are B
ABC No A are B All B are C
ABC No A are B No B are C
ABC No A are B All C are B
ABC None
Table  Types of individual dened by three predicates with example syllogisms which
establish their existence
up to isomorphism This result follows rather directly from the earlier mentioned one that
numbers of types occurring in a model of monadic logic are logically irrelevant For every
type a conjunctive sentence can be constructed which is true if the type is in the model and
otherwise false so a conjunction of these conjunctions can be constructed which characterises
uniquely each possible model since the vocabulary is nite and the number of possible types
is 
p
where p is the number of predicates in the vocabulary	 The reader is referred to any
introduction to metalogic such as Hunter   	 for further amplication of these properties
of logics
The graphical resources of Eulers Circles can be extended beyond the syllogism in some
interesting ways The type ABC constitutes the background on Eulers Circles are drawn
In order for Eulers Circles to express propositions about the existence or nonexistence of
this type Eulers Circles must be augmented by a device for distinguishing the domain set
a convenient one is to represent it by a square The three predicates of a syllogism then
may or may not exhaustively cover the square Note that once the domain of reasoning is
distinguished from the universal domain it becomes a live issue whether or not there are not
As which are not B The lack of the concept of domain is presumably what lead Aristotle to
ignore Utype conclusions
Earlier accounts of the limitations of graphical methods have noted the di
culty of extending
Eulers Circles to more than three predicates see Lewis Carrolls discussion of Venns ve
predicate diagram in Dodgson  	 They have not measured the expressiveness of Eulers
Circles against the model theory of the syllogism nor against its proof theory What we have
shown here is that if one takes the semantic space as the benchmark Eulers Circles are highly
constrained in what they can express However the syllogism is even more constrained and
the constraints of the two types of representation are nested Eulers Circles can express all
the distinctions necessary to capture the syllogism
In assessing our hypothesis about analogy it is important to see that there are these three
systems involved the space of models the graphical representations and the limited linguistic
representations of the classical syllogism We begin with a grasp of the fragment of naive set
theory which structures the models and an understanding of spatial containment but initially
we lack any further grasp of the syllogism beyond an understanding of the quantiers and
connectives involved Spatial containment and more particularly the spatial containments of
overlapping circles on a plane models only a part of the semantic possibilities But it turns
 
out to be enough and more than enough to capture the very limited relations between sets
which can be expressed in the novel logical fragment The mapping is therefore helpful in
reducing the space which we have to learn about
 How do Eulers Circles achieve abstraction
We now return to our general approach to a cognitive theory of graphical representations
and ask how this system of graphical reasoning achieves the abstractions required to capture
syllogistic logic
The pivotal shift from a primitively concrete interpretation of the diagrams to an abstract one
is the shift from interpreting areas as corresponding to established types to interpreting areas
as corresponding to consistent types This is the rst prerequisite to achieving a onetoone
mapping between diagrams and premisses and hence eliminating the disjunctions of diagrams
necessary under the primitive interpretation Note that this abstractive interpretative con
vention is global It applies equally to all areas of a diagram not just some of them One can
construct bizarre conventions which apply the abstractive convention to some areas and not
to others perhaps augmented with some extra colouring or annotation convention to distin
guish the domain of application	 but it seems intuitively clear that such conventions rapidly
become just thatbizarre The psychological complexity of their application outweighs any
advantage that the use of graphics might confer
Abstraction is available but not just any abstraction It is psychologically interesting that
psychologists chose the interpretation of Eulers Circles which is primitive in our sense of
the termunder Ericksons interpretation one diagram stands for one actual model Under
the interpretation normally adopted in teaching logic one diagram stands for many actual
models but only one maximal model Thus graphics are adapted to the logic by complicating
the ontology Such shifts are quite common in graphical systems but we still claim that it
is theoretically illuminating to distinguish between primitive interpretations and these more
complex abstractive ones and psychologists opted for primitive interpretation
The addition of the shading convention to this shift of interpretation is what allows a one
toone mapping of premisses to diagrams While each characteristic diagram can show all
consistent types diagrams representing the two dierent existential premisses can be distin
guished by the types they establish This representational scheme corresponds to the strategy
of choosing the weakest case an extremely important principle in any proof system In fact
this is the same strategy as that adopted for choosing Berkeleys geometrical gures mentio
ned above If exemplars can be ordered on a dimension of strength dened so that what
follows for any weaker case follows for all stronger cases then the validity of an inference can
be established by reasoning about weakest cases one principle underlying some casebased
reasoning	 Abstraction is achieved by representativeness
Finally there is a degree of animation in our graphical system Having superimposed the
B circles we consider a range of relative positions for the A and C circlesour constraints
are constraints on possible motion We might represent this range by a set of dotted circles
exploiting a common convention for depicting motion in still diagrams Animation here
represents a disjunction of possibilities by a sequence of alternatives thought of as distributed
 
through time The animation required for our purposes is less than the truly continuous
variety In each case we only really need consider the ve possible alternatives for the
relative positions of the A and C circles
Animation either by real dynamic graphical representation or by the suggestion of movement
in a still representation	 is another device for achieving abstraction A primitive interpretation
of a sequence of animated states has all the specicity of the primitive interpretation of a
still graphic but our proposed interpretation of the animation treats the sequence as a set
of disjoined clauses and is thus another way of introducing abstraction Animation is a
particularly powerful technique when a substantial part of the scene stays constant It is then
perceptually easy to focus on the part that is changing and to exploit the redundancy of what
remains the background In the case of our diagrams the motion can always be limited to
one of the three circles
This review of the conventions and strategies which introduce abstraction into the interpre
tation of graphical representations illustrates how our graphical system has a particularly
transparent relation to the model theory of the syllogism Validity is dened as truth of con
clusion in all models consistent with premisses Our diagrams represent all types consistent
with two premisses and therefore represent all the available ingredient types out of which in
terpretations of the premisses which make them true must be constructed The diagrams also
distinguish types which must exist in all models obligatory constituents of all models of the
premisses	 and therefore allow formulations of valid conclusions This transparent relation
between the diagrams and the denition of validity is a powerful aid to understanding the
distinction between contingent truth and logical validity
The discourse of proof in a deductive logic is a rather unusual type of discourse and teachers
of logic are only too familiar with the di
culties those new to logic experience in grasping
the distinction Indeed even psychologists running experiments on logically naive subjects
frequently experience the same phenomenonDo you want to know whether the conclusion
is true or whether it must be true is a common question The evidence albeit based
on the folklore of the profession rather than controlled experiment is that the graphical
methods outlined here make this relation transparent in a way that directly teaching a calculus
obscures
	 Implementing Eulers Circles in the Mind
In this section we consider issues raised by implementing our graphical algorithm for syllogism
solution It is important to be clear about the goal of implementation Eulers Circles
embodied as rings pastrycutters and drawing pins or pencil and paper drawings together
with the control mechanisms of the user are a computational mechanism We have shown how
that mechanism can be interpreted as implementing syllogistic reasoning Now we move on to
questions about what computational mechanisms might implement this external mechanism
in a syllogisers mind in particular when he or she solves syllogisms without recourse to
external diagrams
It iss worth noting that the same general questions can be asked about the syllogiser who uses
pencil and paper to draw Eulers Circles there is still a question about what computational

mechanisms operate in their minds But it is a dierent question and it diers chiey in the
lesser involvement of working memory for attribute bindings Our reasons for pursuing the
case where no external diagrams are used are rstly that we dont know very much about
how people perform with externalised diagrams The studies such as Newstead  	 which
have used drawings have mostly concentrated on subjects interpretational errors rather than
their ability to combine premisses But secondly it is the memory for bindings which is
of particular interest What distinguishes verbal reasoning problems which people exhibit
such di
culty with from text comprehension which people show such amazing facility at
is not the logical complexity of inferences involved Understanding texts involves extremely
complex inferences as witnessed by the attempts to simulate these inferences in AI What
distinguishes these areas is that socalled verbal reasoning problems require the establishing
of temporary bindings of attributes to individuals without long term memory support and the
consideration of possibly many	 alternative patterns of binding of the same material This
is what presents such problems to the faculties of human deductive reasoning We require an
account of how the bindings that external Eulers Circles keep track of are implemented in
the mind And the account must explain the peculiar prole of abilities we observe
The role that the graphical algorithm plays in this approach is that it presents dierent
implementational problems than say mental models or natural deduction algorithms These
chiey dier in the role that geometry plays in dening operations on circles Since we
observe that the external circles are conducive to reasoning we speculate that it is because
this external aids maps onto internal structures and processes perspicuously And so the
algorithm provides hints as to what these processes might be We do not however believe
in the style of some imagery researchers that what is implemented within is isomorphic to
the full detail of the external aids We rather look for minimal internal implementations and
these turn out to be much more modest than the registration diagrams on the printed page
In order to be clear about the goals of implementation we begin by reviewing some gene
ral phenomena of human verbal reasoning and the role PDP implementations may play in
explaining them We then discuss in more detail one particular PDP model of the mecha
nism of attribute binding in human working memory and the part this proposed mechanism
might play in implementing the graphical algorithm Finally we compare this model to other
proposals relevant to explaining somewhat dierent aspects of human reasoning performance
At the greatest level of generality graphical representations and connectionist mechanisms
share some salient computational properties Graphical representations force the resolution
of referential and spatial relations onto systems which may or may not possess the necessary
informationthey are specic in our terminology Connectionist mechanisms resolve multi
ple constraints which may logically only partially determine an outcome into fully determinate
outputs So for example a picture of two individuals cannot avoid determining to which in
dividual a represented property is attributed Similarly a connectionist representation of this
property binding will always resolve attributions one way or the other see eg the system
described below	
Still remaining at this very general level of description both graphical representations and
connectionist mechanisms have the property that they agglomerate informationone repre
sentation is constructed which incorporates all fragments of information and therefore forces
the resolution of relationships between constituent parts see Stenning   	 for a more ex
 
tended comparison of agglomerative vs analytical representations	 Human verbal reasoning
exhibits several phenomena which can be described as examples of this tendency to agglome
rate information into total rather than partial representations Both the literature on nterm
series problems eg Huttenlocher  	 and that on syllogisms eg JohnsonLaird  
Erickson  	 make this observation as does the text memory literature eg Kintsch 
van Dijk  	 in which total connectivity is often taken as denitional of coherent text
However much these general comparisons may lack in implementational detail their impor
tance cannot be overestimated Conventional rule based approaches to human reasoning may
have provided great implementational detail but they have never oered any explanation of
this pervasive property of human reasoning strategy Nor is clear that they could The ge
neralised computational power of conventional rulebased approaches is their downfall in this
respect It is as easy for them to compute with partial as with total representations
Another important general property of human deductive reasoning is that it is strongly af
fected by the content over which people reason Content eects take place at many levels
Perhaps the most straightforward is interference by premisses or conclusions which are known
to have a particular truth value in the real world and particularly if this truth value has heavy
emotive undertones eg Janis  Frick   Leord   Oakhill Garnham  Johnson
Laird  	 Another type of content eect is that in which content aects the interpretation
placed on the premisses of an argument This type of eect is best illustrated in the conditio
nal reasoning literature eg Wason  	 Yet another type of content eect the one that
will chiey concern us here is an eect of richly associative content enhancing performance as
compared to performance with schematic symbolic material As JohnsonLaird  	 points
out artists beekeepers and chemists are easier to reason about syllogistically than As Bs
and Cs
It seems unlikely at least to the present author that the rst two types of content eects are
particularly suited to an explanation in terms of an underlying PDP architecture as opposed
to a conventional one At the very least they rst require a theory about how content leads to
dierent processing choices which could perfectly well be expressed in conventional rulebased
terms The last type of eect does however seem to be a good candidate for distinguishing
underlying architectures The phenomenon consists of the observation that material with
rich associative history is mnemonically more manageable in whatever working memory it is
that supports syllogistic reasoning Associative memory is just what can be modelled more
adequately in a PDP framework than a conventional one
However the modelling problem is an interesting one because the memory task involved in
solving syllogisms in the head is not merely one of associative memory In common with
most deductive tasks it involves creating representations of hypothetical individuals from
combinations of properties and considering various dierent assortments of these individuals
This binding and rebinding is just what is not easy to implement in connectionist systems
although there is a growing list of proposals about how this might be achieved eg Barnden
  Halford et al this volume	 Shastri  Ajjanagadde   Stenning  Levy  	 So
modelling the impact of associative content on verbal reasoning is a nicely balanced exercise
for PDP modellers
These alternative proposals for solving the binding problem are each designed for rather
dierent purposes and from rather dierent perspectives Stenning and Levys proposals are

motivated by the desire to t particular data that arise in a memoryforbindings task whereas
the other proposals are all for extensions to the PDP modellers armoury of architectures It
is not clear whether or not these other proposals could exhibit the sort of errorundernoise
behaviour which the Stenning and Levy model simulates because they have not addressed
this issue
Stenning and Levy took the experimental data of Stenning Shepherd  Levy  	 consi
sting of frequencies of dierent types of errors of recall in a task where subjects remembered
mappings of properties onto individuals They showed that this data could be modelled by
assuming a distributed representation of binding and indeed required such an assumption
We will briey describe the model they proposed Our purpose is to explore the implicati
ons of their ndings for the working memory underlying syllogisms Eulers Circles because
they are graphical force the specication of every individual on all the represented property
dimensionsif there are three circles on a plane every region of the plane is either inside
or outside each circle Stenning and Levys model shares this computational property not
because it is graphical but because it represents bindings through contraint satisfaction
Stenning Shepherd and  Levys data come from a task in which subjects read paragraphs
attributing four properties each to two individuals objects with shapes colours textures and
sizes or people with professions nationalities physiques and temperaments	 The data which
concern us here consist of frequencies of twenty categories of error selected for what they reveal
about the underlying representation The initial observation was that some multiple attribute
errors cases in which more than one property is incorrect	 are much more common than they
should be if each attribute of each individual were independently bound For example a
common error is to remember that the two individuals contrasted on a dimension but get
the binding the wrong way rounda Polish bishop and a Swiss dentist are retrieved as a
Polish dentist and a Swiss Bishop This is much commoner than remembering two Polish
individuals as two Swiss ones and is about as common as simply making one error on a
dimension on which the individuals contrasta Polish bishop and a Swiss dentist retrieved
as a Polish bishop and a Polish dentist
Such observed frequencies suggest that there is something in common between the represen
tations of the two reversals which makes them more similar and therefore more confusable
than independent nonredundant representations would be These isolated observations pose
a general questionis there a set of features which can be represented independently and
therefore corrupted in memory independently	 which can capture the frequencies of the errors
which dene combinations of their corruption Features simply state facts about the pair of
individuals eg There are two people of same nationality There is a person both happy
and Polish etc	 and so their truth value is determined for any pair of people presented
Any error best thought of as a transformation from input description to recall description	
therefore changes the truth value of some features and leaves others unchanged The more
features which change the less likely is the error The features may be weighted to reect
their salience This methodology can be seen as another application of principles underly
ing such classic perceptual feature extractions as Miller  Nicelys  	 demonstration of
phonemic features underlying consonant confusions in speech
Stenning Shepherd  Levy show that a set of   features which t the error frequency data
well can be found using regression techniques Table  shows an example feature set with

Feature Coe
cient Standard Error
Intercept 
 xBxDx	    
 xAxDx	    
 xAxCx	   
 xBxCxDx	   
 xAxBx	   
 xBxCxDx	   
 xAxBxDx	   
 xAxCxDx	   
 xAxBxCx	    
 xAxBxCx Dx	   
 xCx	  
 x yAxAyx  y	   
 x yBxByx  y	   
 x yDxDyx  y	  
nmat  
Table  Summary of features in representation of binding adapted from Stenning Shepherd
 Levy  	 The coe
cients are measures of the weight attached to features in predic
ting error frequencies Nmat is an abbreviation for There is more than one mismatched
dimension
their relative weightings This set illustrates the web of logical relations between features
Once corruption occurs the truth value of one or more features changes	 the likelihood is that
the set will then be inconsistent there are only   consistent sets of values out of 

	 The
memory retrieval mechanism then has the constraint satisfaction problem of nding a closest
tting pair of individuals which maximises the number or aggregated salience	 of feature
values in the corrupt representation This is a hard problem of just the type that PDP
networks perform well Stenning and Levy show that a simple backpropagation network can
learn the logic relating the features in the regression model from presentations of wellformed
inputs with their corresponding outputs When the trained network is then presented with
randomly corrupted inputs all of which are novel stimuli	 its output exhibits a frequency
prole of error types which closely approximates both the regression model and the human
data Figure  shows the network and Figure  compares the frequency proles of human
memory data the regression models predictions the PDP simulation and a nonredundant
representation of the same information Performance of this nonredundant representation
contrasts with the distributed memory simulation and with human memory	 most clearly
in producing no triple or quadrupleproperty errors These complex errors are relatively
frequent in distributed memories
What this model achieves is a reduction of the complex binding problem posed by the experi
mental task into a simpler one of binding attributes within the simple conjunctive existential
features in the regression model We would claim that the feature Both A or both B need
not be expressed disjunctively	 Knowledge of coinstantiations of properties establishes kno
wledge of references A more complete model would have to explain how the simple binding
problem within the existential features of this model is implemented in terms of associative

Figure  A PDP network which retrieves the bindings of four binary properties to two
individuals The input layer bottom	 is a distributed representation of the set of bindings
in the output layer top	 From Stenning and Levy   by permission of the publishers
ButterworthHeinemann Ltd
c

memory for content We do not have a simulated model of this implementation but it is
worth making some comments about the nature of the solution required because this has
implications for the explanation of the content dependence of memory
We assume that a feature such as There is someone both Polish and a bishop may be further
analysed in memory into some contentful associations which enable the subject to choose
between the possible bindings of these properties namely Polish bishop Swiss bishop Polish
dentist and Swiss dentist So for example if a subject remembered there being evidence of
a catholic person that might be su
cient to implement the binding between polish and
bishop Swiss bishops arent stereotypically catholic polish dentists arent stereotypically
religious and Swiss dentists arent stereotypically either If this example does not work
for you choose whatever example associations do work for your knowledgebeliefs about
these properties	 Similarly the evidence is that the implementation of the feature that
there are two people of dierent nationality is achieved in contentful fashion Memory for
matchingmismatching on dimensions does not deteriorate with proactive interference in the
way one would expect if the coding were simply a schematic match or mismatch
The computational model is therefore incomplete but nevertheless performs an important re
duction of the problem from the task of binding attributes to their references to the problem of
conjoining properties in simple existential statements The combination of experimental ob
servations and modelling provide strong evidence that binding is represented in a distributed
contentful fashion and resolved by constraint satisfaction inference from such a representation
We now explore the implications of this architecture for verbal reasoning and for graphical
representations and compare this proposal with other solutions to the binding problem
As we have seen solving syllogisms by the graphical algorithm we have specied requires
keeping track of collections of types of individual dened in terms of the three properties

Figure  Log frequencies of twenty categories of error for a	 human data b	  noise
applied directly to descriptions of individuals c	 regression model predictions and d	 PDP
network simulation noise Details of errortypes are explained in Stenning Shepherd 
Levy   From Stenning and Levy   by permission of the publishers Butterworth
Heinemann Ltd
c


Select models to represent.
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Figure  Schematic embedding of a distributed memory for bindings in a syllogism solution
system
contained in the premisses This core memory problem is closely analogous to the binding
problem set to Stenning Shepherd and Levys subjects It is not the only memory required to
implement syllogistic reasoningsubjects also need to keep track of some of the information
about premisses and require internal memory of the strategies and processes of reasoning
Nevertheless this memory for bindings is a central part of the di
culty of di
cult syllogisms
for human reasoners So the line of investigation we will pursue here is to suppose that the
heart of the syllogism solving system is a memory for bindings based on a mechanism like
Stenning and Levys model The strategic processes of reasoning then operate over the output
of this module the collection of types represented on the output units	 and have the ability
to reset the model held by the module by changing its inputs Figure  shows a schematic
architecture What syllogistic reasoning shares with the straight memoryforbindings task
is that models consist of collections of individuals in this case dened by three properties
rather than four	 What syllogistic reasoning adds to the straight memoryforbindings task of
Stenning Shepherd  Levy is the need to consider several patterns of binding in one problem
at least in the di
cult cases To see what is involved consider the registration diagrams in
Figures   and  Each diagram represents collections of types directly and also implicitly
represents ranges of collections which correspond to potential movements of the A and C
circles Consider rst what is involved in representing the basic static registration diagrams
Information about the number of individuals present plays an important role in the Stenning
and Levy model of binding in terms of existential features Only if we know that there are

exactly two individuals can we make the necessary inferences from the state of the feature
set Feature sets could be constructed for dierent numbers of individuals but having a
determinate number is important Solving the existential constraints into bindings relies on
knowing how many indiviuals there are in the model If human working memory implemented
the external graphical representations completely that would require representing collections
of from three to seven types of individual Interestingly this range is smaller among syllogisms
which do have valid conclusions from three to ve types	 The only ones having six or seven
types in their registration diagrams are ones with two particular premisses and these are
syllogisms for which subjects readily reject any conclusion as valid So one might suppose that
an application of this principle applied to show that no diagramanalogue need be constructed
This would leave the need for the representation of three dierent sized sets of types three
four and vemembered
Another strategy that can be used to reduce the complexity of the binding problem is to focus
on the nailed subarea of the diagram This focus reduces the number of types to a constant
singleton set but would still require some representation of constraints on the movement of A
and C circles This brings us to consideration of movement This in turn suggests a further
strategy for limiting the variation in number of individuals represented Movement is the
second extension that would be required to implement our graphical algorithm in a binding
mechanism like that of Stenning and Levy
Each registration diagram is an invitation to consider whether or not the A and C circles can
move relative to each other Nails are constraints on such movement Externally we could
actually implement Eulers Circles as rings preferably expandable and contractable rings	
sliding on a at surface constrained by nails But how is discovery of constraint on movement
to be implemented internally
Movement consists in change of model ie change of membership of the set of types But
not any change from model to model is possiblethe possible changes are structured by
the geometry of the circles We can conceptualise these movements as transitions between
models arranged in a seven dimensional space where each dimension represents the presence
or absence of a type in the model One of the main functions performed by the graphical
representations is that they make it transparent which transitions are possibleby merely
considering a direction of relative movement of the A and C circles it becomes clear which
types	 of individual will be added to the model or deleted from the model by the movement
The graphical aid reveals an important property of the transitionsthat they always add or
delete just one type The transitions are minimal changes Or more precisely any transition
that makes more than one additiondeletion of types can be replaced by several transitions
which change only one type The graphical representations introduce a certain continuity
into the range of models to be considered
It is this continuity which aords important mnemonic savings The positive or negative
nature of the syllogism determines the relevant direction of movement which the reasoner
has to consider Movement in that direction can be a minimal movement which will add or
delete just one type The distribution of shading will allow the choice of which is the relevant
transition to consider if there is more than one So this apparatus oers the possibility of
considering just one model represented by the registration diagram of the syllogism	 and just
one addition or deletion of a type to or from that model This reduces the binding problem

to the holding of one modelone collection of types The identity of the additiondeletion to
be considered can be held in some other memory or as an annotation on the main memory
for the registration diagram Instead of having to consider perhaps three whole models each
arbitrarily related to the others one model with potential minimal change su
ces
How might this movement mechanism be implemented The minimal supposition would be
that some rule based system encapsulating the possible transitions between models could
operate as an external strategic controller of a binding mechanism of the type considered
above Such a controller could reset the model held in the PDP mechanism by recourse to
changing the state of its inputs In such an architecture the geometry of the graphics is
built into a module quite separate from the binding mechanism which merely holds arbitrary
collections of types The content dependence of the binding mechanism would still have its
eects but there would be no special inuence of content on the transitions from model to
model
A more radical direction for investigation would be a connectionist implementation of the
possible transitions from model to model which correspond to circle movement Such a
system would be a connectionist implementation of the rule based controller It would have
to be capable of representing each of the models corresponding to a registration diagram
including all those created by movements of the A and C circles	 and representing directions
of movement at least A towards C and A away from C	 Starting in a state representing
one model and given an input corresponding to a direction of movement the system would
have to transition into the state representing the next model in that direction A sequence
of such direction commands issued from outside the system would cause it to travel through
the space of registration diagrams
This would require an implementation in a dynamic connectionist system analogous to but
more complex than that of Amit  	 or Dehaene Changeux and Nadal  	 One
might expect systems like this and with much greater complexity	 to exist for the purpose
of planning action on visually presented scenes Although little is known about how such
systems can be congured by learning algorithms it is not clear that biological systems do
arise in this way It seems likely that much preconguration of these visualmotor mechanisms
has been achieved through evolution
Several literatures are relevant to our abilities to manipulate spatial congurations without
external aid There are studies of tasks designed to demonstrate the existence of specialised
mechanisms for such manipulations eg Brooks  	 and there is extensive use of related
items in psychometric measurement of spatial ability There is also the literature on the
visuospatial sketchpad Baddeley  	 responsible for visual working memory and the
literature on memory for information about static spatial arrays described in text eg Mani
 JohnsonLaird  	 The mental rotation task of Shepherd  Metzler   	 may involve
some of the relevant mechanisms But none of the tasks involved explicitly analyse our ability
to make judgements of relations between components of spatial arrays that would result from
actions on initial congurations In this connection Hinton    	 makes the interesting
argument that it is the type of continuity of representation observed in the animations of our
registration diagrams that plays a major part in explaining data on visualisation but that
this sort of continuity does not presuppose what he calls atomic depiction which is often
claimed to be required by observed mental rotation data The contrast is roughly between

structural descriptions which may have continuously valued variables attached to them as
opposed to genuinely analogue representations
A dynamic connectionist controller which implemented the operations on registration dia
grams could be separate from the memory for bindings module in the same way that the rule
based controller might	 The names used to identify models inside the controller module
would not necessarily have to be analysable down to the level of the component properties of
their constituent types and the problem of binding together properties would not arise within
the controller It would simply operate on the output of the memoryforbindings module
The remaining issue is whether memoryforbindings and controller should be further inte
grated into one module The answer will make a dierence to the type of error behaviour
the system will exhibit This is really a question of how far the contentdependent memory
for bindings ramies through the system If the separate controller simply operates on the
output of the binding module one would expect content to aect general memorability of the
base registration diagram from which reasoning proceeds but not to aect which models are
considered as deformations of this model corresponding to movements of the A and C circles
If the memory used by the controller is the same memory as the memoryforbindings and is
therefore content dependent in the same way one would expect content to aect the ease of
considering movements of the A and C circles
To make this distinction more concrete it can be posed with regard to the user of external
graphical aids If a reasoner translates a syllogism into the medium of three circles simply
tagged by letters reasoning proceeds by considering the circles without recourse to the content
of the premisses save as it is represented by the schematic letters and then the results are
reinterpreted into contentful terms this is analogous to the controller being separated from the
memory for bindings If however the encoding into the graphical representation maintains
content which has eects through its associative properties on the manipulations performed on
the circles then the two modules are integrated and the interference eects will be dierent
Without detailed simulations and more detailed error data than is currently available these
alternatives cannot be decided A further complexity is that reasoners of dierent levels
of expertise exhibit dierent sorts of content eects and may best be modelled by dierent
systems
Finally it is useful to compare this line of development of implementations for our graphical
algorithm with other proposals for attribute binding within connectionist systems CONPO
SIT Barndens  	 system of binding exploiting Relative Position Encoding RPE	 and
Pattern Similarity Association PSA	 actually chooses JohnsonLairds mental model method
of syllogistic reasoning as an illustrative domain As mentioned above the purpose of this
implementation is to illustrate connectionist techniques which are of considerable cognitive
interest in themselves but the issue of the content dependence of human reasoning is not
explored largely perhaps because it is not explored in the mental model theory chosen for
implementation RPE solves the problem of setting up temporary and arbitrary bindings of
attributes together by placing tokens of the attributes in adjacent positions in a spatial array
representation What is adjacent is bound What is distant is not bound From one perspec
tive this constitutes symbol processing but from another it can be seen as implementing
temporary virtual nets
In the current context of spatial analogy this proposal is intriguing because it uses a spatial

representation in which adjacency in a D sheet of elements carries the binding information
It appears to use the sheet in a quite dierent way than Eulers Circles though we have
already mentioned above that mental models notation hides its relation to Eulers Circles
Like mental models CONPOSIT uses RPE to represent types of individual as clumps of
tokens in adjacent areas but does not exploit the properties of the plane to relate dierent
collections of types through movement in the plane Whether or not further exploitation of
the spatial arrangement is possible is at present an open question as is the question of how
content eects can be modelled in this framework
Other current connectionist proposals for implementing binding have not been so directly
related to syllogistic reasoning by their authors Shastri  Ajjanagaddes  	 implemen
tation of binding by phaselocking is designed to implement a database query language for
performing reex reasoningthat fragment of reasoning over the contents of a database
which can be performed quickly and with some degree of independence of the size This
system implements queries of the form of an impressively large fragment of the predicate cal
culus and does so in time linear with the shortest proof This system has several properties
relevant to human reasoning performance It has severe limitations on how many individuals
it can reason about variables bound during an episode of reasoning	 but can reason over very
large databases of long term information This accords well with human performancein
fact the observation is so pervasive that it is scarcely mentioned in the literature
Although the phase locking implementation of bindings may be applicable to our domain
there are a number of obstacles in the path of applying Shastri and Ajjanagaddes current
system to syllogistic reasoning The distinction between longterm database and an episode
of reasoning over it does not easily transfer to the syllogistic case in which the domain of
reasoning and general facts about it are created anew for each problem The very facility of
human reasoning over the sort of problem Shastri and Ajjanagaddes studies contrasted with
the laborious and unreliable performance with some syllogisms suggests that at least some
dierent systems are involved In fact the system which performs inferences over the long
term knowledge base is one of the systems which actually leads to interference of content
with reasoning in the syllogistic task If people could isolate their knowledge that All men
are women is false from their syllogising system they would not display the interference
eects psychologists observe in reasoning with such premisses Although the systems are not
identical they also do not seem to easily be totally decoupled
Shastri and Ajjanagaddes proposals like those of Barnden do not address the issue of inter
ference eects that is not the focus of Shastri and Ajjanagaddes work and the systems do
not use the distributed representations which would bring this issue to the fore
To summarise this discussion of connectionist implementation of our graphical algorithm
two broadly contrasting interests in the problem have been the desire to extend the compu
tational abilities of connectionist systems on the one hand and to model features of human
performance particularly the intrusion of content into reasoning on the other The two
aims have produced proposals which are largely complementary rather than competitive and
considerable work remains to be done to see how the two sets of results can be integrated
What is important to Stenning and Levys concerns is that the binding of attributes to in
dividuals that appear in problem descriptions is based on a constraint satisfaction inference
from data at a lower level of representation It is this distinction of levels which opens the
 
door to studies of the content dependence of working memory and its impact on reasoning
The particularities of the constraintsatisfaction device that appears in their model is of less
concern It is possible that the other proposals for binding described here may be combined
with distributed representations that can be connected to a long termassociative memory
and if this proves to be the case the two broad aims will be met in one system

 Analogy and the reduction of expressiveness
Our case study has shown how one detailed working out of the analogy of spatial containment
in the form of Eulers Circles is less expressive than elementary settheory The spatial analogy
cuts down the problem space Perhaps the most instructive conclusion that can be drawn
from developing the full detail of this example for which we know the destination task is that
it is the combination of vehicle and topic that results in this reduction in expressive power
It is not that spatial containment necessarily less rich than set membership but it is bringing
the general analogy to bear on the use of circles to model syllogisms that achieves the gains
in processability The general analogys applicability is reliant on the limitations of the logic
which it is used to model as much as on the geometrical limitations of circles and on the
combination of logic and geometry in particular
Even if we augment syllogistic logic in quite trivial ways we have to augment our graphical
resources beyond circles If we move to full monadic predicate calculus even if we restrict our
vocabulary to three predicates we can no longer manage with closed curves The relevant
addition here is of the machinery of iterated quantication and a full set of connectives This
addition makes it possible to distinguish every model from every other as mentioned above	
and therefore to require diagrams for all the models without Eulers Circle diagrams see
Figure 	 Some of these models require discontinuous regions Some of the complexities that
arise with increasing the number of predicates beyond three are illustrated in Lewis Carols
text through his correspondence with Venn see Dodgson  		
Once we go beyond monadic predicate calculus to polyadic calculi graphical methods have
to retrench still further in what they can achieve There are other ways of using graphical
methods to teach polyadic predicate logic cf Barwise and Etchemendys Tarskis World
and Hyperproof programs	 but they do not exploit the spatial inclusion analogy Even for
monadic predicate calculus the analogy is unhelpful because it is too inexpressive
Does analogy generally work by limiting expressive power Is a muzzle a good analogy for
analogy Our temptation is to answer yes At least this seems a hypothesis worthy of pursuit
In the cases of analogy most discussed in the literature it is often hard to see exactly what
the end result inference system is that corresponds to the Eulers Circle system for syllogism
solution But it does seem that these end results may exist implicitly When plumbing is
used to understand electricity it is only a small part of electrical behaviour which the analogy
models eg Ohms Law but not magnetic eld induction	 Along with this conclusion that
what is derived from a general analogy is often a circumscribed inference system comes some
clarication of the relation between analogy and general issues of representation from which
both elds may benet
What does connectionist implementation add to these morals about analogy Connectio

nism compared to symbolic approaches is analogous to graphical representations compared
to linguistic logical	 representationsthe key to understanding their contribution to cogni
tive science is their curtailment of expression In our specic proposals about connectionist
implementations of our graphical algorithm the implementations play two roles the rst is
to analyse attribute binding as an inferential achievement rather than a representational pri
mitive	 in a way that explains why people choose a reasoning strategy which involves whole
patterns of binding This in turns holds out the future possibility of explaining the observed
dierences of performance when people reason with As Bs and Cs and with artists beekeepers
and chemists because it suggests how to connect content eects with binding performance
The second role of connectionist implementation is that it can exploit the continuity aorded
by graphical representations in simulating the movement of circles If we have apparatus
designed for imagining spatial rearrangements of a certain continuous variety then this
could be brought to bear on graphical representations in a way that it could not be brought
to bear on other notationally equivalent representations eg mental models	 In doing so
it could eect mnemonic savings which would bring the syllogism within the compass of a
memoryforbindings for a xed number of individuals
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